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a b s t r a c t
We present a functional interpretation of Peano arithmetic that uses Gödel’s computable
functionals and which systematically injects uniformities into the statements of finite-
type arithmetic. As a consequence, some uniform boundedness principles (not necessarily
set-theoretically true) are interpreted while maintaining unmoved the Π02 -sentences of
arithmetic. We explain why this interpretation is tailored to yield conservation results.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In 1958 [6] (see also [7] and [8]), Kurt Gödel introduced an interpretation of Peano arithmetic into a quantifier-free theory
of finite-type functionals. Gödel’s interpretation consists of two steps. First, Peano arithmetic is interpreted into Heyting
arithmetic by a negative translation. Afterwards, Heyting arithmetic is interpreted into the quantifier-free theory via what
is now known as Gödel’s (functional) dialectica interpretation. Almost ten years later, Joseph Shoenfield defined in his well-
known textbook [17] a direct functional interpretation of Peano arithmetic. Shoenfield’s interpretation and its variants are
especially perspicuous for an undeviating study of classical theories. A case in point is the work of functional interpretations
of admissible set theories (see [3]).
Both interpretations of Gödel and Shoenfield are based on a transformation of formulas whose analysis of ∀∃-formulas
is given in terms of witnessing functionals. (As an aside, recent work of Thomas Streicher and Ulrich Kohlenbach in
[13] shows that Shoenfield’s interpretation can be ‘‘factored’’ into Krivine’s negative translation [16] and the dialectica
interpretation.) By maintaining Gödel’s functionals but relaxing their witnessing role to that of a mere bound (and, in the
process, introducing some uniformities), a new functional interpretation, with a novel assignment of formulas – dubbed the
bounded functional interpretation – was recently introduced by Paulo Oliva and the present author in [5]. In common with
Gödel’s, this interpretation is also two-barreled. In this paper we introduce a direct bounded functional interpretation of
Peano arithmetic, in the style of Shoenfield.
The interpretation defined in the sequel is not set-theoretically faithful, in the sense that it introduces uniformities
which collide with set-theoretic truth. For instance, the axiom of extensionality is refuted. Due to its simplicity, the
interpretation reveals very distinctly its characteristic principles, i.e. the principles that we can add to Peano arithmetic
and still obtain a soundness theorem. One of these characteristic principles subsumes the so-called uniform boundedness
principle introduced by Kohlenbach in [11] (and discussed interestingly in [12] in a wider setting), as well as a Brouwerian
FAN type principle. The role of this characteristic principle is to inject uniformities, and a simple (but somewhat superficial)
way of describing it is to say that it is a vast higher-order generalization of the bounded collection scheme in the first-order
arithmetic setting.
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Classically, weak König’s lemma (WKL) is a consequence of the Brouwerian FAN principle alluded to above. As an
illustration, we give a new proof of Harvey Friedman’s conservation result of the second-order arithmetical theory WKL0
over the base theory RCA0.
2. Majorizability unvarnished
In the bounded functional interpretation, it is necessary to introduce a notion of intensional, i.e. rule-governed,
majorizability. Except for the intensional bit, the notion of majorizability in question is Mark Bezem’s notion of strong
majorizability given in [2], a modification of the majorizability notion introduced by William Howard in [9]. The fact that
this notion needs to be governed by a rule, instead of mere axioms, is crucial in proving the soundness theorem for the
new interpretation. As we will see, without this feature our main theory below would be inconsistent. In a sense, the rule
deactivates the computational capacity of the majorizability relation with respect to the functional interpretation.
The languageLωE is described in detail in sections 2 and 6 of [5]. However, since we are in a classical setting, we restrict
LωE to the logical words∨, ∀,¬ and the bounded quantifier ∀xE t (x does not appear in the term t). The other logical words
are defined classically in the usual manner. Mutatis mutandis for the existential bounded quantifier. Note the presence of
the (intensional) majorizability binary relation symbols Eτ – one for each finite type τ (we usually omit the type-subscript)
– in the bounded quantifiers. The majorizability relation symbols are governed by the axioms
M1 : x E0 y↔ x ≤ y,
M2 : x Eρ→σ y→ ∀u Eρ v(xu Eσ yv ∧ yu Eσ yv).
Note that we do not have the biconditional above (that would give Bezem’s extensional notion). In its stead, we have the
rule RLE
Abd ∧ u E v→ su E tv ∧ tu E tv
Abd → s E t
where s and t are terms ofLωE , Abd is a bounded formula and u and v are variables which do not occur free in the conclusion.
The only quantifiers in a bounded formula are the bounded quantifiers, and these are regulated by the axiom scheme
B∀ : ∀x E tA(x)↔ ∀x(x E t → A(x)).
Concerning equality, we adopt the minimal treatment described in Anne Troelstra’s commentary [19] to Gödel’s seminal
dialectica paper, whereby there is only an equality sign ‘=0’ infixing between terms of type 0. The question of equality must
always be dealt with some care in functional interpretations. In point of fact, the main theory introduced in the next section
refutes the axiom of extensionality.
Our theory has the usual arithmetical axioms, including the scheme of induction for all formulas of the language
(parameters are permitted). At this point, we finish our brief presentation of the classical theory PAωE . In the sequel, we
shall use some simple results provable in it, namely concerning the majorizability relations. All these results are stated and
proved in [5].
A term is t is monotone if t E t . A monotone quantification is a quantification of the form ∀b(b E b → · · ·), abbreviated
by ∀˜b (. . .). Note that monotone quantifications are not bounded quantifications (nor are they vacuous for non-zero types).
In the following, the underlined letters are meant to represent (possibly empty) tuples of variables. The mixed use of these
abbreviations is self-explanatory.
Definition 1. To each formula A of the languageLωE we assign formulas (A)
U and AU so that (A)U is of the form ∀˜b∃˜cAU(b, c),
with AU(b, c) a bounded formula, according to the following clauses:
1. (A)U and AU are simply A, for bounded formulas A.
For the remaining cases, if we have already interpretations for A and B given by ∀˜b∃˜cAU(b, c) and ∀˜d∃˜eBU(d, e) (respectively)
then we define:
2. (A ∨ B)U is ∀˜b, d∃˜c, e(AU(b, c) ∨ BU(d, e)),
3. (∀xA(x))U is ∀˜a∀˜b∃˜c ∀x E aAU(b, c, x),
4. (¬A)U is ∀˜f ∃˜b ∃˜b′ E b¬AU(b′, f b′),
5. (∀x E tA(x))U is ∀˜b∃˜c ∀x E t AU(b, c, x).
The matrix (¬A)U includes the bounded quantification ‘∃˜b′ E b’ in order to make the following crucial monotonicity
condition hold true:
Lemma 1. For each formula A of the languageLωE , we have
PAωE ` ∀b∀c∀c ′ E c(AU(b, c ′)→ AU(b, c)).
Implications A→ B are defined by ¬A ∨ B. A simple computation shows that (A→ B)U is
∀˜f , d∃˜b, e(∀˜b′ E bAU(b′, f b′)→ BU(d, e)).
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3. Characteristic principles
There are three principles which play an important role in the interpretation defined in the previous section. The proper
formulation of the first two principles should be with tuples of variables. To ease readability, we formulate themwith single
variables. However, the reader should keep in mind that arguments pertaining to these principles should comprehend the
tuple case. This can be achieved either by introducing product types in the language or, better still, by arguing directly (at
the cost of slight complications vis a vis the single-variable case).
I.Monotone Bounded ChoicemACωbd:
∀˜b∃˜cAbd(b, c)→ ∃˜f ∀˜b∃˜c E fb Abd(b, c),
where Abd is a bounded formula ofLωE .
II. Bounded Collection Principle bBCω:
∀z E c∃yAbd(y, z)→ ∃˜b∀z E c∃y E b Abd(y, z),
where Abd is a bounded formula ofLωE .
III.Majorizability AxiomsMAJω: ∀x∃y(x E y).
It is worth making some brief comments on the second principle. Its contrapositive permits the conclusion of the
existence of an element z (with z E c) such that ∀y¬Abd(y, z) from the weaker statement that such z’s only exist locally,
in the sense that for each (monotone) b there exists z (with z E c) such that ∀y E b¬Abd(y, z). We may regard such a z as
an ideal element that works uniformly for each b and whose postulation does not affect (as we will see) real consequences.
(We thank Reinhard Kahle for suggesting this Hilbertian reading of the soundness theorem below.)
The theory PAωE with the above principles is not set-theoretically sound. For instance, it refutes the weakest form of
extensionality. That is, it proves the negation of the sentence ∀Φ2∀α1, β1 (∀k0(αk = βk)→ Φα = Φβ). In effect, assume
this form of extensionality. In particular, one has
∀Φ E2 12 ∀α, β E1 11∃k (αk = βk→ Φα = Φβ),
where 11 := λk0.10 and 12 := λγ 1.11. By bBCω , one may infer
∃n∀Φ E2 1∀α, y E1 1 (∀k < n(αk = βk)→ Φα = Φβ).
Take one such n = n0. DefineΦ according to:
γ 1  Φ
{
0 if ∀k ≤ n0 (γ k = 0)
1 otherwise.
It is clear that for α := λk.0 and β := λk.δn0,k (Kronecker’s delta) one has ∀k < n0 (αk = βk) but Φα 6= Φβ . Since it is
easy to show thatΦ E 12 and α, β E 11, we are faced with a contradiction.
Let us write Ext(Φ) for saying that the type 2 functional Φ is extensional, i.e. ∀α1, β1 (∀k0(αk = βk) → Φα = Φβ).
Despite the classical setting, we can prove the following version of the Brouwerian FAN principle: Every extensional type 2
functional is uniformly continuous on the Cantor space (see, also, [12]). In symbols,
∀Φ2(Ext(Φ)→ ∃n∀α, β ≤1 1 (∀k ≤ n(αk = βk)→ Φα = Φβ)).
The argument is easy. Suppose that Ext(Φ). Then,
∀α, β E1 1∃k(αk = βk→ Φα = Φβ).
As in the previous argument, by bBCω there is a natural number n such that ∀α, βE1 1(∀k ≤ n(αk = βk)→ Φα = Φβ).
Take now arbitrary α, β ≤1 1 and suppose that ∀k ≤ n(αk = βk). Using the rule RLE, it can be proved that min(α, 11)E1 1
andmin(β, 11)E11,where theminima are takenpointwise. Note thatα andmin(α, 1), andβ andmin(β, 1), respectively, are
type 1 functionalswhich take the same values for each natural number. By the above, we getΦ(min(α, 1)) = Φ(min(β, 1)).
Now, by the extensionality ofΦ , we conclude thatΦα = Φ(min(α, 1)) andΦβ = Φ(min(β, 1)). We are done.
4. The soundness theorem
Prima facie, it is not even clear whether the theory PAωE together with the three principles above is consistent. As we will
see in a forthcoming section, the ‘‘flattened’’ version of PAωE +mACωbd + bBCω +MAJω is inconsistent. Notwithstanding, the
soundness theorem below does in fact guarantee the consistency of the original version (relative to Peano arithmetic). The
following theorem is crucial for the proof of soundness:
Theorem 1 (Howard). For each closed term t ofLωE , there is a closed term q of the same type such that PA
ω
E ` t E q.
Essentially, this theorem appeared in [9]. It was shown for Howard’s ‘‘flattened’’ majorizability relation and a
corresponding ‘‘flattened’’ theory (see Section 6), but his argument goes through in the intensional setting (cf. [5]). Note
that the result only holds for closed terms (the theory PAωE does not proveMAJ
ω).
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Theorem 2 (Soundness). Suppose that
PAωE +mACωbd + bBCω +MAJω ` A(z),
where A is an arbitrary formula ofLωE (with free variables as shown). Then there are closed monotone terms t of appropriate types
such that
PAωE ` ∀˜a∀z E a∀˜b AU(b, t(a, b), z).
Note. The reader might have been expecting
PAωE ` ∀˜a∀z E a∀˜b∃y E t(a, b) AU(b, y, z)
at this point. However, note that AU is monotone in the second variable (cf. Lemma 1). We used the notation t(a, b) instead
of the official (t a)b. We also use t a b in the sequel.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the length of the derivation of A(z). We rely on the complete axiomatization of
classical logic described by Shoenfield in sections 2.6 and 8.3 of his textbook [17]. In the following, we discuss a few cases
only. To ease readability, we use single variables instead of tuples and we usually omit the free variables z.
Let us start with the propositional axiom¬A∨ A. Let (A)U be ∀˜b∃˜cAU(b, c). A simple computation shows that (¬A∨ A)U
is
∀˜f , b∃˜a, c (∃˜a′ E a¬AU(a′, fa′) ∨ AU(b, c)).
Therefore, we need to find closed monotone terms t and q such that
PAωE ` ∀˜f , b (∃˜a′ E tbf¬AU(a′, fa′) ∨ AU(b, qbf )).
It is clear that we may put t := λb, f .b and q := λb, f .fb.
We now consider the contraction rule which permits the inference A from A ∨ A. The seemingly innocuous contraction
principle is always a delicate matter for functional interpretations. In Gödel’s dialectica interpretation, the interpretation of
certain forms of contraction requires not only the decidability of the matrices of the interpretation but also characteristic
terms for those matrices (cf. the discussions in [19] and in [1]). In the present case, the matrices AU are bounded formulae
and need not even be decidable. That notwithstanding, the interpretation of the above contraction rule is obtained by a
sleight of hand using the properties of the majorizability relation. Again, assume that (A)U is ∀˜b∃˜cAU(b, c). By the induction
hypothesis there are closed monotone terms t and q such that
PAωE ` ∀˜b, d(AU(b, tbd) ∨ AU(d, qbd)).
Wemust find a closed monotone term r such that PAωE ` ∀˜bAU(b, rb). Well, in the theory PAωE it is possible to define, for
each type τ , a monotone closed term maxτ of type τ → (τ → τ) such that
PAωE ` x Eτ x ∧ y Eτ y→ x Emax
τ
(x, y) ∧ x Emax
τ
(x, y).
This is explained in [5]. Therefore, using the monotonicity of AU in the second variable, we readily see that the term
r := λb.max(tbb, qbb) does the job.
Let us now consider the Cut Rule that allows the inference of B∨C from A∨B and¬A∨C . Assume that (A)U is ∀˜b∃˜cAU(b, c),
(B)U is ∀˜d∃˜eBU(d, e) and (C)U is ∀˜u∃˜vCU(u, v). By the induction hypothesis there are closed monotone terms t , q, r and s
such that
(1) PAωE ` ∀˜b, d(AU(b, tbd) ∨ BU(d, qbd)) and
(2) PAωE ` ∀˜f , u(∃˜b E rfu¬AU(b, fb) ∨ CU(u, sfu)).
Wemust find closed monotone terms k and l such that
PAωE ` ∀˜d, u(BU(d, kdu) ∨ CU(u, ldu)).
Let us put k := λd, u.q(r(λb.tbd, u), d) and l := λd, u.s(λb.tbd, u). We now check that these closed monotone terms
do the job. We reason inside PAωE . Fix monotone d and u. By (2) above, either ∃˜b E rf0u¬AU(b, f0b) or CU(u, sf0u), where f0
abbreviates λb.tbd. If the latter case holds, we are done. Otherwise, there is a monotone bwith b E rf0u and¬AU(b, f0b), i.e.
¬AU(b, tbd). By (1) above, we get BU(d, qbd) and hence, by monotonicity, BU(d, q(rf0u, d)). Therefore, BU(d, kdu) and we are
done.
Let us now consider the substitution axioms ∀xA(x) → A(t), where t is a term free for x in A. Assume that (A(x))U is
∀˜b∃˜cAU(b, c, x). A simple computation shows that we must find closed monotone terms r , s and l such that
PAωE ` ∀˜f , b(∀˜a E rfb∀˜b′ E sfb∀˜x E aAU(b′, fab′, x)→ AU(b, lfb, t)).
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By Howard’s majorizability Theorem 1, take a closed monotone term q such that PAωE ` t E q (see the comment ahead).
Now, put r := λf , b.q, s := λf , b.b and l := λf , b.fqb. It is clear that these terms do the job. Let us comment briefly on the
case in which parameters (free variables) z occur, e.g. t is of the form t[z]. In this case, we apply Howard’s theorem to the
closed term λz.t[z]. Since in the statement of the soundness theoremwe only have to consider those z below a certain given
monotone element, everything goes fine.
We finish the study of the logical reasoning by considering the ∀-introduction rule that infers ∀xA∨B from A∨B, provided
that x is not free in B. Assume that (A(x))U is as in the previous case and (B)U is ∀˜d∃˜eBU(d, e). By the induction hypothesis,
there are closed monotone terms t and q such that
PAωE ` ∀˜a, b, d∀x E a(AU(b, tabd, x) ∨ BU(d, qabd)).
We obviously get PAωE ` ∀˜a, b, d(∀x E aAU(b, tabd, x) ∨ BU(d, qabd)). But this is what we want.
The axioms regarding combinators, the axioms M1 and M2 and the equality axioms for =0 have trivial interpretations,
since they are universal. The rule RLE also poses no difficulty (see [5]). At this juncture, let us observe that the soundness
theoremwouldn’t go through if instead of the rule onewere to have the axioms ∀v∀uEρ v(xuEσ yv∧yuEσ yv)→ xEρ→σ y.
The bounded functional interpretation would ask for closed monotone terms t such that the theory PAωE proves
∀˜a, b, c∀x E a∀y E b∀v E c (∀v E tabc ∀u Eρ v (xu Eσ yv ∧ yu Eσ yv)→ x Eρ→σ y),
and such terms are simply not available (in order to conclude x E y, the value v cannot be bounded). Such an impossibility
can be argued directly, but it is also a consequence of the inconsistency of the ‘‘flattened’’ theory discussed in Section 6.
The axioms B∀ are easily dealt with, especially if we see them as abbreviations of two corresponding conditionals. The
scheme of induction is better analysed via the induction rule. Of course, the recursors are needed here (this is the only
place where they are needed) and the analysis poses no difficulty (even though one has to be careful with ensuring the
monotonicity of terms).
Finally, the characteristic principles trivialize under the interpretation, and thewitness terms are readily forthcoming. For
instance, after some computations, the interpretation of the bounded collection principle bBCω asks for a closed monotone
term t such that
∀˜a, b∀c E a(∀z E c∃y E bAbd(y, z)→ ∀z E c∃y E tbaAbd(y, z)),
and t := λa, b.b obviously works. Similarly, the majorizability axioms MAJω ask for a closed term t such that PAωE `
∀˜a∀x E a(x E ta). The analysis of monotone bounded choicemACωbd is also straightforward. 
A particular case of the above theorem section is the important:
Corollary 1. If PAωE+mACωbd+bCωbd+MAJω ` ∀x∃yAbd(x, y), where Abd is a bounded formula with its free variables as shown,
then one already has PAωE ` ∀a∀x E a∃yAbd(x, y).
This corollary can be refined in an interesting way. As is well-known, Georg Kreisel has often remarked that the use
of true universal lemmata in the proof of ∀∃-sentences does not affect the extraction of bounds. Within the framework
of Gödel’s dialectica interpretation, this can be readily seen by observing that the dialectica interpretation of a universal
sentence is (essentially) the universal sentence itself. Kohlenbach generalized Kreisel’s observation by considering a wider
class of sentences. In his framework of themonotone functional interpretation (see [10]), the verification of the bounds of the
∀∃-consequences takes place using slightly stronger lemmata than the original ones (nevertheless, the stronger lemmata are
true if the original lemmata are: this is of importance for the applications of the monotone functional interpretation).
Wemay formulate a similar observation in our setting. In the above soundness theorem, it is clear that we can substitute
(both in the hypothesis and the thesis) the theory PAωE by the stronger PA
ω
E+∆, where∆ is constituted by universal closures
of bounded formulas. This can be generalized to a wider class of sentences, with the added twist that the verification takes
place using slightly weaker sentences (see also Section 7.1 of [5]):
Corollary 2. Let∆ be a set of sentences of the form ∀˜b∃u E rb∀vBbd(v, u, b), with r a (closed) term and Bbd a bounded formula.
If
PAωE +mACωbd + bCωbd +MAJω +∆ ` ∀x∃yAbd(x, y),
where Abd is a bounded formula with its free variables as shown, then one already has PAωE +∆w ` ∀a∀x E a∃yAbd(x, y), where
∆w is the weakening of ∆ consisting of the sentences of the form ∀˜b, c∃u E rb∀v E cBbd(v, u, b), each one corresponding to a
sentence of∆.
Proof. Note that the sentences in∆ are consequences of∆w together with the bounded collection principle. Observe now
that the sentences in∆w are universal sentences with bounded matrices. 
Let us advance a speculative note regarding the above issue. Mathematicians are very liberal (in the sense of not
caring) in their use of induction (and comprehension). They are oblivious to the complexity of the statements they are
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inducting over. Logicians, on the other hand, are very sensitive to issues of definability and know that induction (together
with comprehension) is the main reason for the advent of fast growing bounds. Nevertheless, as a matter of common
mathematical experience, really fast growing functions almost never show up in ordinary mathematics. This is a puzzling
phenomenon. I want to point out that certain forms of induction are tame in this respect, namely induction for bounded
formulas. In these cases, induction takes the form
Abd(0) ∧ ∀n < m(Abd(n)→ Abd(n+ 1))→ Abd(m),
with Abd a bounded formula. As we saw above, statements like this are dealt by our interpretation effortlessly, with no
need of recursors. NB after ‘‘flattening’’ (see Section 6), bounded formulas may have very high logical complexity. To what
extent can inductions in ordinarymathematics be put in this form? The use of tame forms of induction is a particular case of
using lemmatawhich have trivial interpretations (andwhich are true after ‘‘flattening’’). Can lemmata of this kind formulate
statements which have mathematically interesting consequences? (In a sense, the answer to this question is a trivial ‘yes’
because corresponding statements considered by Kohlenbach in his work can be dealt by lemmata of this kind. The question
is really meant for mathematical statements beyond those.)
For other comments concerning our interpretation, including its relation to the Gödel–Shoenfield interpretation and
Kohlenbach’s monotone functional interpretation, see our recent [4].
5. The characterization theorem
The characterization theorem shows that a formula A and its uniformization AU are equivalent provided that we
are allowed to use certain principles. A conspicuous difference between Shoenfield’s interpretation and the present
interpretation is that the principles allowed for the former – namely, the axiom of choice for quantifier-free matrices (cf.
[14]) – have an unproblematic interpretation and are set-theoretically correct.
Theorem 3 (Characterization). Let A be an arbitrary formula ofLωE . Then,
PAωE +mACωbd + bBCω +MAJω ` A↔ (A)U.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of A. Let us discuss the case of negation. Suppose (A)U is ∀˜b∃˜cAU(b, c).
By mACωbd, the latter formula is equivalent to ∃˜f ∀˜b∃˜c E fb AU(b, c). By monotonicity, this is equivalent to ∃˜f ∀˜bAU(b, fb)
and, hence, to ∃˜f ∀˜b∀˜b′ E bAU(b′, fb′). Therefore, ¬(A)U is equivalent to (¬A)U. By the induction hypothesis, the former is
equivalent to ¬A, and we are done for this case. The equivalence concerning the case of the bounded universal quantifier
uses the principle of bounded collection bBCω . This principle, as well asMAJω , is needed for the equivalence concerning the
plain universal quantifier. The case of the disjunction sign is straightforward. 
It is not apparent what is accomplished by showing the equivalence between a formula A and its uniformization (A)U
within the intensional theory PAωE+mACωbd+bBCω+MAJω . The problem lieswith the status and interpretation of this theory
(see the next section). Nevertheless, the characterization theoremhas the following theoretical consequence: It ensures that
we are not missing any principles besidesmACωbd, bBC
ω andMAJω in our statement of the soundness theorem. To see this,
suppose that we could state the soundness theorem with a further principle P. Since P is a consequence of itself, soundness
would give the existence of a closed monotone term t such that PAωE ` ∀˜b PU(b, tb) and, therefore, PAωE ` (P)U. By the
characterization theorem above, we get PAωE +mACωbd+ bBCω +MAJω ` P. In conclusion: Pwould be already superfluous.
Both in the Shoenfield interpretation and in the present interpretation, the treatment of negation is responsible for the
raising of types. Negations, and especially iterated negations, have the effect of raising the types and making the translation
somewhat opaque. As Georg Kreisel commented in a related context: ‘‘those iterated [negations] make my head spin’’ (cf.
p. 147 of [15]; Kreisel actually wrote ‘implications’). This is in general unavoidable, but not so in the case of conjunction.
If we translate a conjunction A ∧ B in terms of our primitive logical words, we get ¬(¬A ∨ ¬B): three negations appear,
two of which are nested. However, in the presence of PAωE + mACωbd + bBCω + MAJω , (A ∧ B)U is equivalent to A ∧ B and,
therefore, to (A)U∧(B)U. The latter is classically equivalent to ∀˜b, d∃˜c, e (AU(b, c)∧BU(d, e)), given that (A)U is ∀˜b∃˜cAU(b, c)
and (B)U is ∀˜d∃˜eBU(d, e). Indeed, we could have started with the conjunction sign as primitive and define (A ∧ B)U by
∀˜b, d∃˜c, e (AU(b, c) ∧ BU(d, e)): the soundness theorem would still hold.
6. Flattening
The theory PAω≤∗ is Peano arithmetic in finite types (with theminimal treatment of equality referred to above) formulated
in the usual language of arithmetic extended by primitivemajorizability symbols≤∗τ (one for each type τ ) and the associated
bounded quantifiers. We call this language Lω≤∗ . The following axioms (Bezem’s majorizability relations) govern these
symbols:
x ≤∗0 y↔ x ≤ y
x ≤∗ρ→σ y↔ ∀u ≤∗ρ v(xu ≤∗σ yv ∧ yu ≤∗σ yv)
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(note the biconditional above) and the axioms of the form ∀x ≤∗ t A(x) ↔ ∀x(x ≤∗ t → A(x)). Of course, PAω≤∗ is a
straightforward extension by definitions of plain PAω . The former formulation is considered only for convenience.
The next result is clear:
Lemma 2 (Flattening). Suppose that PAωE ` A, where A is a sentence of the language LωE . Then PAω≤∗ ` A∗, where A∗ is the
sentence ofLω≤∗ obtained from A by replacing throughout the binary symbols Eτ by≤∗τ .
This simple lemma provides the passageway from the intensional theories to PAω≤∗ and, therefore, to the set-theoretical
world. As a typical illustration, suppose that the intensional theory PAωE +mACωbd+ bBCω +MAJω proves aΠ02 -sentence of
first-order arithmetic. By the corollary of the soundness theorem, this sentence is provable in PAωE and, by flattening, in PA
ω
≤∗ .
As a matter of fact, the sentence is even provable in first-order Peano arithmetic because PAω≤∗ has a suitable interpretation
in it (there is an internal coding of the finite-type functionals within first-order Peano arithmetic: the hereditarily recursive
operations – cf. [20]).
In particular, the above argument shows that the theory PAωE+mACωbd+bBCω+MAJω is consistent (relative to first-order
Peano arithmetic). This is a syntactic consistency argument, and onewonderswhether one can find a veridical interpretation
of the theory PAωE +mACωbd + bBCω +MAJω . This seems to be a delicate task because the ‘‘flattened’’ version of this theory
is inconsistent. Let us show that the theory PAω≤∗ together with the following ‘‘flattening’’ of a particular case of bBC
ω:
∀γ ≤1 1∃n0Abd(n, z)→ ∃m∀γ ≤1 1∃n ≤0 mAbd(n, z),
is already inconsistent (in the above, Abd is a bounded formula in the flattened sense, i.e. it is of the form A∗ for a bounded
formula A of the languageLωE). By classical logic, ∀γ ≤1 1∃n(¬γ ≤1 01 → γ n 6= 0), where 01 := λk0.00. Since ¬γ ≤1 01
is a bounded formula in the flattened sense, we may infer by the above form of collection that there is a natural numberm
such that
∀γ ≤1 1(∃n(γ n 6= 0)→ ∃n ≤ m(γ n 6= 0)).
Obviously, this can be refuted.
7. The conservativity of weak König’s lemma
The Shoenfield-like bounded functional interpretation provides a very perspicuous proof of Friedman’sΠ02 -conservation
result of the theoryWKL0 overRCA0 (see [18] for the terminology and the result). The proper setting for discussing this result
is not the theory PAωE but rather its subtheory PRA
ω
E . The latter differs from the former in that it only allows the recursor
R0 of type 0 – resulting in the finite-type functionals in the sense of Kleene (cf. section 5.1 and footnote 10 of [1]) – and
restricting the scheme of induction
Aqf(0) ∧ ∀n0(Aqf(n)→ Aqf(Sn))→ ∀nAqf(n)
to quantifier-free formulas Aqf (possibly with parameters of arbitrary type) in which the new predicate symbols E do not
occur. It is clear that one can formulate and prove a soundness theorem for PRAωE as in Section 4. Mutatis mutandis for the
ensuing corollaries.
The second-order language of arithmetic can be embedded in LωE by letting the first-order variables run over type 0
arguments, letting the second-order variables run over type 1 variables α such that α E1 1, and by interpreting n ∈ α by
αn = 0. Under this embedding, we claim thatWKL0 is a subtheory of PRAωE + mACωbd + bBCω + MAJω . We need to check
that the latter theory proves induction forΣ01 -formulas, recursive comprehension and weak König’s lemma. It is folklore (in
a slightly different setting) that the first two principles follow from PRAωE together with the numerical axiom of choice for
quantifier-free matrices, i.e.
∀n0∃m0Aqf(n,m)→ ∃α1∀nAqf(n, αn),
where Aqf is quantifier-free. Note that this form of choice is an immediate consequence ofmACωbd.
It remains to prove weak König’s lemma, i.e.
∀T E1 1(Tree∞(T )→ ∃α E1 1∀k0 T (αk) = 0),
where αk denotes the number-code of the binary sequence 〈α0, . . . , α(k − 1)〉 and Tree∞(T ) abbreviates the conjunction
of
∀s0(T (s) = 0→ Seq2(s)) ∧ ∀s, r(T (r) = 0 ∧ s  r → T (s) = 0)
with the infinity clause ∀n0∃s0(T (s) = 0∧ |s| = n). We are using standard notation: Seq2(s) expresses that s is the number-
code of a binary sequence, s  r says that the binary sequence given by s is an initial segment of the binary sequence given
by r , and |s| is the length of the binary sequence given by s.
Assume Tree∞(T ). By the infinity clause and the fact that T is a tree, wemay conclude that ∀n0∃αE1 1∀k ≤ n T (αk) = 0.
The reason is simple: given (the code for) a binary sequence s of length n + 1, the type 1 function α which prolongs s by
zeros satisfies α E1 1. Now, using the contrapositive of bBCω , we get ∃α E1 1∀k0 T (αk) = 0. Q.E.D.
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We just need the punch line to prove Friedman’s conservation result. Suppose thatWKL0 proves aΠ02 -sentence φ. Then,
PRAωE + mACωbd + bBCω + MAJω ` φ. By the corollary to the soundness theorem, PRAωE ` φ. Therefore, by flattening,
PRAω≤∗ ` φ. In fact, RCA0 ` φ because there is a suitable internal coding of the finite-type functionals in the sense of Kleene
in first-order Peano arithmetic with induction restricted toΣ01 -formulas (this is a watered down version of the hereditarily
recursive operations). Of course, this restricted version of Peano arithmetic is a subtheory of RCA0.
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